



Lee's Dispatch



Captain Bob Lee SCV Camp 2198

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Commander's Report

By Doug Garnett

"This is what we do" words spoken about SCV members who have cleaned the graves, repaired headstones, placed flags on graves to honor them. When asked by someone outside the SCV they were told "This is what we do".

Members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans we all took an oath to carry on the mission of our ancestors. We pledged our allegiance to the United States of America and to its Constitution. We all further promised to defend this country and its constitution against all enemies. Our pledge, our promise to our ancestors is a solemn vow which is not in parts we get to pick and chose to follow.

"They left us a passionate belief in freedom for the individual. Our Confederate ancestors bequeathed to us a military tradition of valor, patriotism, devotion to duty, and a spirit of self-sacrifice. When our nation no longer admires and pays tribute to these traditions, we will no longer remain a free nation"

These traditions, beliefs should make us all gentlemen, never to raise a voice in anger against one another but to peacefully work out our differences and most of all support on another.

To remember our ancestors, to take care of them to keep them safe and allow them to rest knowing we have their backs. We honor them, we remember them and we will keep their images, their names and their cause in front of those who would erase our ancestors and the write them out of history. We protect our ancestors by cleaning their graves, repairing and cleaning their stones by placing flags on their graves. We are the Sons of Confederate Veterans and we have not forgotten our promise to our ancestors and **THIS IS WHAT WE DO.**

Lee's Dispatch is the official newsletter for the Sons of Confederate Veterans Captain Bob Lee Camp 2198 and is intended for the sole purpose of keeping the camp members and friends of the camp informed to the activities and news of Camp 2198. Statements in this newsletter are those of the author and may not reflect the opinions of the Captain Bob Lee Camp, editor or the National Sons of Confederate Veterans. Within articles or quotes written by outside authors mistakes in spelling, grammar or sentence structure are strictly those of the author and may be left as is.



September 21 – 22 Waxahachie Living History

Chautauqua 2012 Educational Program

<http://www.waxahachiechautauqua.org/chautauqua-2012-educational-programs-1>

October 5-7 Battle of Fort Crawford at Hallsville, TX

<http://www.fortcrawford2010.com/>

October 18-22 Battle of Raymond, Raymond, MS

http://divisioncavalrybrigade.com/event_notices/Raymond2012.htm

October 18-22 Battle of Lake Hubbard, Hubbard, TX

<http://www.hubbardcity.com/Civilwar.html>

Events of 150 years ago

September 1862

September 1st Battle of Chantilly, Virginia

September 14th Battles of South Mountain and

Crampton's Gap

September 15th Fall of Harper's Ferry to Confederates

September 17th Battles of Antietam and Munfordville

September 19th Battle of Iuka Mississippi

September 22nd Following the Union victory at Antietam

Emancipation Proclamation issued.

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No respect for the Dismounted Cavalry
By
Curtis J Ogle
Commanding 20th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

It is not easy for me to pin point a beginning for this column, but I am assured that I must. I think I will begin with some simple facts. We know, the Cavalry in the South was as strong a force as any in the North. Lighting quick raids were conducted in almost every campaign during the war. When the Cavalry was forced to stand their ground and fight, they would “dismount” and go into battle on foot. One out of four was left behind to hold the horses while the rest went into battle. That was how “mounted Cavalry” fought.

The terms “dismounted” does not always mean ounce mounted Cavalry troops. Late in 1862, the Department of the Trans – Mississippi discovered it had 21 regiments of Infantry and 36 regiments of mounted Cavalry. Well, they decided to “dismount” every other mounted Cavalry unit and order them to turn over their horses and fight the remainder of the war on foot. Infantry was needed more than anything else. So instead of renaming their unit, they tacked on (Dismounted) to their regiments title and continued to draw Cavalry pay.

The weaponry carried by most of the Cavalry units from Texas was a grab bag of shotguns, squirrel rifles, hunting rifles, antique flint lock guns and so on. Very much what you see someone using to defending their home or would be hunting with. Some dismounted units, were issued proper military firearms. The unit we resurrected was issued 1862 Tower Enfield's that made it through the blockade. They used them right up until the defeat at Honey Springs where they had lost a many of them during the retreat. So replacements of Kentucky rifles and shot guns had to be issued.

Dismounted Cavalry units today are mostly known as “farbie's.” Far be it for me to question his impression. Broken down further, they are called that because they make do with only the basic overseas made uniforms and equipment. They do not try to improve their impression as reenactors. I have seen some reenactors using crap they found at a yard sale or the good will. You can't do that and still expect respect from other reenactors. Also, the vast majority of reenactors despise short barrel fire arms. Mostly the 1863 model Zouave rifle, the CVA rifles and the Kentucky rifles. They mostly want you to use three band muskets and wear jean wool. Grant it, all that looks great, but is expensive; too expensive for most to afford.

I have recruited a lot of people over the years who only want to do dismounted Cavalry. And had a few fall in who was die hard Infantry men.

Editor's note: The Remington made 1863 Zouave rifle was never issued and remained in Union storage. None saw action during the war.

In either case, both are right for what they want to do. Rather it be your impression or your demeanor, dismounted Cavalry regiments are looked down upon. And to lead by example, I will give you a few examples. In 2009, I participated in an event at Fort Washita (Durant, Ok.) During officer's call, I overheard the Federal Commander exclaim “we don't need any dam dismounts.” Well, as you would think, that didn't go over to well with the guys who were portraying Federal dismounted Cavalry.

In 2004, the last time Middle Boggy (Atoka, Ok) was fought on its original location. I had a double barrel shot gun and asked an Infantry unit if I could fall in with them. They told me no. “Go over yonder with that scatter gun. I think there may be some dismounts that will take you.” Disappointed, I tried to find those “dismount's” and ended up on Federal artillery under Author Street. And again in 2009, the battle of Myers Landing (McKinney, TX) the first day of fighting my unit was not heavily engaged. On Sunday, we were only able to fire four volleys. We were told to support the artillery, and to let the Infantry do their job.

With those examples I gave you, you can see that there is not much respect for dismounted Cavalry. I know we are a strong arm of any infantry regiment for we keep the mounted Cavalry off their flanks; we scout forward and act as skirmishers; yet we still get pushed to the side. Our voice is getting stronger and there is a lot more of us every day. We just need to start thinking outside the box a little and not settle for just the basic. When you do your research, try to find what is correct the first time. Don't just settle for any crappy uniform. For the love of God, do not pay any attention to Hollywood. They almost always get it wrong. Instead, watch other reenactors, ask their opinion. Go to a museum and see what is there. Base your impression on fact; and we will gain the respect we deserve.



A dismounted cavalry reenactor for the past 19 years, Curtis has been sharpening his impression to present a western Texas cavalry soldier (dismounted). Curtis, currently a member of the Captain Bob Lee Camp 2198, has been a member of the SCV for 15 years.

We Drank From The Same Canteen

Tradition of Compassion: There is an old tradition of compassion that began at the cross when Jesus Christ was suspended between heaven and earth dying for our sins. It was during the 6th hour when darkness covered the land. Christ had been beaten, battered, bruised, and his body welted by the torture and heat. Again he cried out. In Matthew 27:48 the word of God says when those guarding him heard his cry out that, "Straightway one of them ran, and took a sponge, and filled it with vinegar, and put it on a reed, and gave him to drink." Compassion: It reminds me of another story concerning water for those who thirst. We call this saga the Angel of Marye's Heights: SGT Richard Kirkland of the 2nd S. C. Infantry, Company G.

On December 13, 1862, at the base of Marye's Heights, located near Fredericksburg, a series of assaults occurred. The aftermath on the fighting found over twelve thousand Union soldiers lying wounded, dying or dead on the field of battle. The wounded cried pitifully for water all that evening, night and into the next morning. One nineteen-year-old confederate soldier was deeply moved by the moans, pleadings and sufferings of the dying inflicted by the angels of sorrow. He could not stand and listen to the sounds of the sufferings of fellow human beings any longer. He asked his commander, General Kershaw, if he could take them water and at first was told no. But later, after determined persistence from the young boy of nineteen, the general gave him approval with the stipulation that there would be no white flag of truce.

Understanding the gravity of the situation and the risk involved, Sergeant Richard Rowland Kirkland gathered up several canteens and went to the aid of his enemy, the wounded Union soldiers. He repeatedly refilled his canteens from Mrs. Stephens' well while under fire,. Soon realizing the mission of mercy that the young man had undertaken, the soldiers from both sides ceased firing, in order to allow him the opportunity to administer this last act of kindness to the dying. One Union officer stated for his men to cease-fire for that man was, "Too brave to die." The unannounced truce lasted for over an hour and a half. The next day, an official truce was made in order to allow the litter bearers and surgeons to finish the job that young Richard had begun. Reasoning had prevailed that day all because of the courage demonstrated by the young sergeant. His action was out of the purity of heart that rings so true throughout the ages. No greater love hath he than he who is willing to lay down his life for another. Due to his act of unselfish valor, this young man became immortalized as the Angel of Marye's Heights by both armies. Less than one year later, on September 20, 1863, he was killed at Chickamauga. In 1965, the great states of Virginia and South Carolina paid homage to the man and dedicated a monument to the memory of Sergeant Richard Rowland Kirkland, the Angel of Marye's Heights.

But there is living water that we can share, must share. It is the water of life and is represented by something that sustains our mortal bodies: Water. During that terrible time so long ago, one of the greatest acts of humanity was to share your canteen with another. During that war, a poem was written that capture the mortal and immortal importance of water. It is called:

We Drank From The Same Canteen
There are bonds of all sorts in this world of ours,
Fetters of friendship and ties of flowers,
And true lover's knots, I ween;
The girl and the boy are bound by a kiss,
But there's never a bond, old friend, like this,
We have drank from the same Canteen!

It was sometimes water, and sometimes milk,
And sometimes apple-jack "fine as silk;"
But whatever the tipples has been
We shared it together in bane or bliss,
And I warm to you, friend, when I think of this,
We drank from the same Canteen!

The rich and great sit down to dine,
They quaff to each other in sparkling wine,
From glasses of crystal and green;
But I guess in their golden potations they miss
The warmth of regard to be found in this,
We drank from the same Canteen!

We have shared our blankets and tents together,
And have marched and fought in all kinds of weather,
And hungry and full we have been;
Had days of battle and days of rest,
But this memory I cling to and love the best,
We drank from the same Canteen!

For when wounded I lay on the center slope,
With my blood flowing fast and so little hope
Upon which my faint spirit could lean;
Oh! then I remember you crawled to my side,
And bleeding so fast it seemed both must have died,
We drank from the same Canteen!



Richard Rowland Kirkland



The 1965 monument for Kirkland

Sharpsburg
September 18, 1862

Yesterday forces under Robert E. Lee were driven from the field by troops under the command of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. Can you see the headlines in the northern papers?

Robert E. Lee, following his August 30th victory at the 2nd Battle of Bull Run, crossed the Potomac river and took the war into Maryland. With close to 55,000 men Lee moved into Maryland on September 3rd. Lee's move into Maryland was intended to run simultaneously with an invasion of Kentucky by the armies of Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith. Lee also needed food and supplies for his men. Fighting in northern Virginia had stripped the farmers of their crops and animals. Confederate leadership also noted that riots in Baltimore, Lincoln having to move to his inauguration in disguise lead them to believe the citizens of Maryland would welcome Lee's Confederate Army.


McClellan was compelled to pursue Lee. With forces numbering around 75,000 McClellan was racing to intercept Lee. It was during this time the famous order 191 wrapped around 3 cigars was discovered by Corporal Barton W. Mitchell and First Sergeant John M. Bloss of the 27th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. Order 191 had detailed plans for Lee's advance into Union territory. This order showed how Lee had divided his forces between Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, and Hagerstown, Maryland. This dispersal opened his forces to isolation and defeat. McClellan always over estimated the number men Lee had to use against him waited some eighteen hours before deciding to attack.

McClellan moved into the Blue Ridge Mountains meeting very strong resistance slowing down his advance allowing Lee to position and strengthen his position along Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson captured Harper's Ferry and was not present at the start of the battle of Sharpsburg.


Gen. Lee positioned his men along a rise behind Antietam Creek. The creek to their front had good cover for his infantry. Rail and stone fences, limestone out croppings, and hollows gave his men good vantage to cover their front. Antietam Creek was only 60 to 100 ft in width and fordable in many places. There was three stone bridges each about 1 mile apart which crossed the creek. To his rear Lee had the Potomac River with only useable place to cross, Boteler's Ford at Shepherdstown. The next crossing was 10 miles away. With the dispersal of the men in Hagerstown and Jackson at Harper's Ferry, Lee only had about 18,000 men left in his immediate command.

The first Union divisions arrived in the Sharpsburg area on the morning of the 15th with the remainder of McClellan's army arriving that evening. Following his cautionary habit McClellan felt Lee had approximately 100,000 men facing him. McClellan delayed his attack till the morning of the 17th. History notes that if McClellan had moved on the morning of the 16th out numbering the southern troops by 3 to 1 an overwhelming victory could have been McClellan's


On the morning of September 17th 1862 Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the ever cautionary combat officer, a man who never felt he had enough, committed his beloved army into the meat grinder along Antietam creek.



Robert E. Lee



George B. McClellan



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McClellan's plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank. He arrived at this decision because of the configuration of bridges over the Antietam. The lower bridge was dominated by Confederate positions on the bluffs overlooking it. The middle bridge was subject to artillery fire from the heights near Sharpsburg. But the upper bridge was two miles east of the Confederate guns and could be crossed safely.

McClellan planned to commit more than half his army to the assault, starting with two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. He intended to launch a simultaneous diversionary attack against Lee's right with a fifth corps, and he was prepared to strike the center with his reserves if either attack succeeded.

The skirmish in the East Woods served to signal McClellan's intentions to Lee, who prepared his defenses accordingly. He shifted men to his left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with one division

Plagued by bad coordination and poor execution his orders caused McClellan's plans to fall apart. McClellan had issued orders to each of the commanders for their own units with giving an overall review of his battle plan. Spread out and terrain prevented the commanders from knowing what was happening outside their own sectors. McClellan's own headquarters were over a mile behind the lines which prevented him from controlling the different areas.

McClellan's plan turned into what could be considered three separate battles. Without the proper coordination the 2 to 1 advantage in numbers was wasted.

In the morning of the 17th Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker moved down the Hagerstown pike with 8,600 men. Hooker's goal was the area around the Dunker Church. "Stonewall" Jackson had organized a very determined defense. A fierce artillery duel opened up when Union troops were seen to enter the corn field. Guns from Jeb Stuart's horse artillery under the command of Col. Stephen d. Lee began firing on the Union troops from the heights around the Dunker Church. Hooker had nine artillery batteries, behind the north woods, return fire. Soon Hooker noticed the sun reflecting off bayonets in the cornfield. A drought had stunted the growth of the corn. Hooker called a halt to his own infantry and called up four artillery batteries. The Confederate forces in the cornfield under the command of General Hood were caught off guard. The Texas Brigade took heavy casualties in that cornfield. The fighting in the morning reduced into savage hand to hand fighting. After two hours and 2,500 casualties both sides found themselves back where they started. When the fighting on the north ended there was a combined loss of 13,000 men.

About midday Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, who had been following the mornings engagements had Brig. Gen. William H. French attack the center of the Confederate lines to attempt a distraction and give relief to Hooker's attacks.

French moved his 5,700 men against Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's 2,500 men, some of whom had been engaged against Hooker's attack that morning. Hill's men were located on a rise which had a "sunken" road from years of heavy wagon traffic. This natural defense position caused French to lose 1,750 men in less than hour. By 10:30 A.M. the last reinforcements from both sides were into the fray. Union Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson with 4000 fresh men was able to strike before the Confederates were able to put into action a plan to envelope French. His men took 540 casualties before being withdrawn from the attack. At last Col. Francis C. Barlow and 350 men of the 61st and 64th New York saw a weak point and seized a knoll which overlooked the sunken road and began to pour withering fire into the Confederates. Miscommunication between Confederate officers caused 5 regiments of the Confederate line to break and begin heading down the pike toward Sharpsburg. Quick action by General Longstreet brought up artillery and drove Richardson's men back. Injuries and fatal wounds to Union commanders drained the moral from the Union troops. The fighting from about 9:30 till about 1 P.M. produced a combined total of 5,600 casualties.

The action picked up in the south when troops lead by Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside in order to create a diversion to Hooker's attack in the north, attacked. Burnside had been told not move until receiving specific orders. His orders arrived about 10 A.M. Burnside had about 50 pieces of artillery, and 12,500 of infantry. Facing Burnside was a force of 3,000 and about 12 pieces of artillery under the command of Brig. Gen. David R. Jones. The rest of the Confederate forces from the right had been pulled off to reinforce the northern and center areas where the heaviest fighting had been earlier in the day.

Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near Sharpsburg, primarily a low plateau known as Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 men under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, with two artillery batteries defended Rohrbach's Bridge. The bridge was dominated by a 100-foot (30 m) high wooded bluff on the west bank, strewn with boulders from an old quarry, making infantry and sharpshooter fire from good covered positions a dangerous impediment to crossing. From these well covered positions sharp shooters and infantry were able to be enfiladed fire down on the Union troops trying to cross the bridge. Each of three attacks was driven back by the fierce defense being put up by Jones' men.

The first attack attempted to wade the creek but found the bank too steep to navigate.

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The first assault on the bridge was started by skirmishers from Connecticut whose orders were to clear the bridge of the Ohio unit to assault the bluffs overlooking the area. They moved up the road under fire from the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery. After about fifteen minutes of fire and 139 casualties including their commander the first assault failed.

A flanking maneuver by a division commanded by Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman had started out earlier, had found their progress slowed by the thick undergrowth of brush. They were looking for Snavely's Ford, which was about two miles down stream. They were to locate, and cross the ford and flank the Confederates. While they were still attempting to locate the ford, a 2nd attack was organized against the bridge.

This attack, by men from Maryland and New Hampshire, also came under fire from the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery. This attack like also quickly fell apart. During this time McClellan, being impatient had been sending messages to Burnside wanting to know about the attack and urging him to take the bridge. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now."

About 12:30, a third attack was launched at the bridge; this time by men from New York and Pennsylvania. These men had been promised a canceled whiskey ration would be restored if they took the bridge. With the assistance of a captured light howitzer shooting double canister through the bridge the infantry was able to move to within 25 yards of the bridge. By 1 p.m. Confederate ammunition running low, Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs commanding, received word of Rodman's men having found Snavely's ford and was crossing. Toombs knew his Georgia troops had slowed Burnside for over 3 hours, and cost him over 500 loses, ordered his men to withdraw to prevent them from being flanked.

The fourth attack on the bridge stalled out, this time on its own. The bridge now became a bottle neck to the Union movement. The officers under Burnside failed to have resupplies of ammunition brought up to the front. The resupply of the much needed ammunition took over two hours. During this delay Gen. Lee made no effort to reinforce Jones' depleted and tired men. He did bring up all the available artillery. Instead of drawing on the men from the left or center Lee was depending on the arrival of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill and his 3000 men, from Harper's Ferry. After a seventeen mile forced march A. P. Hill arrived at 2:30 and was ordered into line on Jones' right.

Burnside intended to circle to the right of Jones and sweep into behind Lee's troops cutting off his only retreat Boteler's Ford. Burnside moved forward about 3 P.M. with around 8,000 and artillery; most of these troops were fresh. The Connecticut men leading the attack had only been in the field three weeks.

Taking 185 casualties the first of the Connecticut units disintegrated. A Rhode Island unit approaching from the right had poor visibility and confusion set in when they saw many of the Confederate units wearing blue uniforms captured at Harper's Ferry. The Rhode Island unit also fled the field. This left the 8th Connecticut unit far out in front, alone and isolated it was quickly enveloped and driven down hill toward the bridge. A counterattack the Ohio Kanawana Division fell short.

Burnside shocked by the collapse of his flank, ordered all of his men back to the west bank of Antietam Creek. He sent requests to McClellan for more men and artillery. McClellan was able to provide just one battery to Burnside. He sent a message that read "I can do nothing more. I have no infantry." In truth McClellan had two fresh corps in reserve. Again his cautiousness came to the aid of the Confederacy. McClellan was concerned about a massive counterattack he felt was sure to come. Burnside spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge his men had paid so dearly a price to capture.

By 5:30 in the afternoon the fighting was over with. McClellan had committed barely 50,000 of his men to the battle. A full 3rd of his men never fired a shot. Five Union generals died during or as a result of their wounds and one Confederate general died.

By the end of the fighting the Union had 12,401 casualties with 2,108 dead. Confederate casualties were 10,318 with 1,546 dead. The combined dead was 3,654. Combined total casualties was 22,719. This represented 25% of the Federal force and 31% of the Confederate. The bloodiest single day of the Civil War was over. More Americans died in that one day of battle than any other so far.

Lee spent the night of the 17th preparing for another attack expected on the 18th that never came. A truce was organized to so both sides could collect and exchange their wounded. Then Lee's men began withdrawing across the Potomac back into Virginia.

McClellan concerned with the lack of supplies and over extending his lines, failed to pursue Lee. It was October 26 before McClellan moved south toward the Potomac. Both the War Department and President Lincoln had sent messages to McClellan urging him to move and pursue the Army of Northern Virginia. Out of frustration Lincoln fired McClellan in November. The dismissal effectively ended McClellan's military career.

The one bright spot for Lincoln was the publicity from McClellan's victory gave him the opening to announce his Emancipation Proclamation.